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ABSTRACT
Background: In India, 50–65% of the population face difficulties in accessing medicines. The
Health Impact Fund (HIF) is a novel proposal whereby pharmaceutical companies would be
paid based on the measured global health impact of their drugs. We conducted a key
stakeholder analysis to explore access to medicines in India, acceptability of the HIF and
potential barriers and facilitators at policy level.
Objectives: To conduct a stakeholder analysis of the HIF in India: to determine key stake-
holder views regarding access to medicines in India; to evaluate acceptability of the HIF; and
to assess potential barriers and facilitators to the HIF as a policy.
Methods: In New Delhi, we conducted semi-structured interviews. There was purposive
recruitment of participants with snowball sampling. Transcribed data were analysed using
stakeholder analysis frameworks and directed content analysis.
Results: Participation rate was 29% (14/49). 14 semi-structured interviews were conducted
among stakeholders in New Delhi. All participants highlighted access to medicines as a
problem in India. There were mixed views about the HIF in terms of relevance and scale-
ability. Stakeholders felt it should focus on diseases with limited or no market and potentially
incorporate direct investment in research.
Conclusions: First, access to medicines is perceived to be a major problem in India by all
stakeholders, but affordability is just one factor. Second, stakeholders despite considerable
support for the idea of the HIF, there are major concerns about scaleability, generalisability
and impact on access to medicines. Third, the HIF and other novel drug-related health
policies can afford to be more radical, e.g. working outside the existing intellectual property
rights regime, targeting generic as well as branded drugs, or extending to research and
development. Further innovations in access to medicines must involve country-specific key
stakeholders in order to increase the likelihood of their success.
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Background
Inadequate access to medicines accentuates worldwide
inequalities in health and income [1,2]. Access is depen-
dent on availability, affordability, quality and proper
use, and involves a complex interplay between govern-
ments, pharmaceutical companies, individuals and
society [3–5]. Access to medicines is a problem across
many countries, for both communicable and non-com-
municable diseases, and at several levels [6–8]. India is
the second most populous country in the world with
17% of the world’s population but it shoulders 21% of
the global disease burden, a major proportion of which
requires medicines [9]. However, in 2004, the World
Health Organization (WHO) estimated that 50–65% of
Indians (499–649 million people) did not have access to
even essential medicines [10]. Not only is overall access
to medicines limited, but the so-called ‘70–70 problem’
exists, i.e. 70% of Indians’ overall medical expenses are
paid upfront and out-of-pocket and 70% of those
expenses are on drugs alone [11]. Out-of-pocket drug
expenditure pushed 34 million people below the pov-
erty line in 2011 [12].
India has a pharmaceutical industry built upon
reverse engineering (analysing products and deducing
and developing ways of manufacturing the product
from that analysis) and generic production (manufac-
ture of an identical form of the drug to the brand name
version) [13]. Since the Trade-Related Aspects of
Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) agreement was
signed by India in 1994 and fully ratified by 2005, the
adoption of product-patent law (where intellectual
property rests with the product rather than the process
of its production) was required and this reverse engi-
neering/generic production model was discarded. The
assumption was that the product-patent model would
incentivise greater innovation in the pharmaceutical
industry and bring about novel medicines at a
CONTACT Amitava Banerjee ami.banerjee@ucl.ac.uk Farr Institute of Health Informatics Research, 222 Euston Road, London NW1 2DA, UK
GLOBAL HEALTH ACTION, 2018
VOL. 11, 1434935
https://doi.org/10.1080/16549716.2018.1434935
© 2018 The Author(s). Published by Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group.
This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits
unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.
competitive price [4,13–15]. However, research sug-
gests the contrary [13], and TRIPS may instead reduce
access to medicines [16], widening global health
inequalities [17,18].
Procurement of essential medicines needs to be
improved to address these imbalances for ethical [3]
and economic reasons [19]. Availability and affordability
are both poor in India [20,21]. Dependent on pharma-
ceutical companies and government [3], they may be
improved by more equitable funding. Recent policies to
improve healthcare in India have focused on public
health infrastructure, universal healthcare coverage,
increased health workers in rural settings and reducing
out-of-pocket expenditure [16−22]. In relation to access
to drugs, the requirements to ‘Improve quality, perfor-
mance, eﬃciency, and accountability of public and pri-
vate health systems’ and ‘Have in place mechanisms to
check and control the use of perverse incentives by
pharmaceutical and biotechnology companies for
health-care providers’ have been recognized as priorities
[21−22]. Policies to broaden access to medicines have
included the Government of India initiative, ‘Jan
Aushadhi’, a countrywide chain of medical stores to
make generic and other drugs available at reasonable
prices, by bulk purchasing and drug price control, but
acceptability and feasibility of these proposals remains
unknown.
The issues that face Indian healthcare are complex
and multiple actions would be required to make
access more equitable [22]. Service delivery, adequate
finance, improvements in health information systems
and good governance are all considered crucial to
healthcare improvement in India, alongside the need
to improve drug access [22]. Improved access to
medicines requires broadening of access to generic
drugs, as well as lowering the cost and improving the
supply of patented drugs. The Rashtriya Swasthya
Bima Yojna (RSBY) scheme was established by the
Government of India in 2008 and aims to provide
health insurance cards worth 30,000 rupees (~US$
500) per year to all citizens living below the poverty
line. National policies such as RSBY and universal
healthcare coverage have indirectly aimed to reduce
out-of-pocket health expenditure which may improve
access to medicines, but no specific national strategy
exists to directly improve access to medicines.
Alternative funding for pharmaceutical innovation
may offer sustainable and equitable access to novel
medicines [17], in the context of declining research
and development and stagnant sales [23,24]. The
Health Impact Fund (HIF), originally described by
philosopher Thomas Pogge and health economist
Aidan Hollis in 2008, is an academic policy proposal,
stimulated by failure of current reward mechanisms
to address access to medicines [25,26]. As a global
agency underwritten by governments, the HIF would
offer pharmaceutical innovators the option to register
any new product. Registration would entitle the inno-
vator to receive, for a defined period (e.g. 10 years) a
share of fixed remuneration from a reward pool.
Working within TRIPS [17,27], the HIF would enable
pharmaceutical companies to be paid based on the
measured global health impact of their drugs [17]
(Appendix 1).
The HIF is still in development via an international,
interdisciplinary team (including AB as a Medical
Advisor and DP as a Scientific Board member). It
requires testing of acceptability and feasibility as well
as modelling of potential implications before any policy
implementation. Global health impact would be pre-
dicted based on preliminary trial data (‘efficacy’) and
reward would be based on actual impact (‘effective-
ness’). The exact nature of global health impact assess-
ment is yet to be finalized, but would require: (i)
modelling and extrapolation of trial efficacy data to a
particular population at country or regional level; (ii)
estimation of ‘real world’ effectiveness using actual
outcome data; and (iii) calculation of ‘reward’ based
on the impact of the drug (Appendix 2). All firms
would have the option to register a new drug with the
HIF and, by doing so, must sell the drug at the lowest
possible cost, which would be determined by the lowest
feasible cost of production and distribution and accept-
ability of all stakeholders, including governments,
payers, patients and pharmaceutical companies [17].
The financial reward would be a portion of pooled
resources, financed by governments and other donors,
during the drug’s patent [17,28]. The HIF would, the-
oretically, drive development of drugs that have use in
diseases with a high burden worldwide. This may
improve access to novel medicines within India, by
reducing costs and improving supply. A sum of $6
billion per year (provided by partner countries sup-
porting the HIF) has been suggested as the minimum
amount necessary to allow the HIF to support devel-
opment of two drugs per annum, sustaining a stock of
20 medicines [27].
Previous surveys and studies have considered
access to medicine [29] but the HIF and other pro-
posals to improve access to medicines often lack
evidence before implementation, with limited evalua-
tion of proposed benefits. The acceptability of the
HIF (which is a policy proposal in development) to
key stakeholders is unknown and will affect its feasi-
bility in India and other countries. We therefore
conducted the first stakeholder analysis of the HIF
as a means for improving access to medicines in India
with the following aims:
(1) To determine key stakeholder views regarding
access to medicines in India.
(2) To evaluate acceptability of the HIF.
(3) To assess potential barriers and facilitators to
the HIF as a policy.
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The HIF is intended as a global policy, funded by
governments, but this study was designed to specifi-
cally assess Indian perspectives in relation to it.
Methods
Design and setting
This study used stakeholder analysis as its primarymeth-
odology, defined as ‘a process of systematically gathering
and analysing qualitative information to determine
whose interests should be taken into account when devel-
oping and/or implementing a policy or program’ [30].
Due to time and resource constraints, but also due to the
geographic concentration of major stakeholders in Delhi,
recruitment was in this setting in India. In consultation
with Research and Information Systems for Developing
Countries (RIS, which is based within the Ministry of
External Affairs, Government of India, and has specific
expertise in trade and intellectual property-related mat-
ters, including in relation to healthcare) we identified key
actors. We divided stakeholders into six categories: phar-
maceutical sector, public health, intellectual property
law, government, non-governmental organizations
(NGOs) and research funding organizations. We
explored influence and power by questions focusing on
the alliances and resources of the stakeholders [31–33].
Based on inductive interpretation of the interview, sta-
keholders’ power/influence was categorized for their sec-
tor, according to whether they had high or low influence
on policy relating to access to medicines (e.g. the HIF),
‘specifically the degree to which they were able to place
the issue on the public or political agenda; influence
legislation; actively participate in major decision-making
fora; and mobilize on this issue’ as per a previous stake-
holder analysis [32]. We ensured diversity of stakeholder
perspectives in the research setting (New Delhi, India) in
order to represent a range of sectors and a spectrum of
opinion with respect to the HIF [34]. Ethical approval
was obtained from the Independent Ethics Committee at
the Centre for Chronic Disease Control, India, and the
Internal Research Ethics Committee, University of
Birmingham, UK.
Sample
We supplemented purposive recruitment of partici-
pants with snowball sampling [34] and used the
iterative nature of theoretical sampling [35,36].
Instead, we focused on diversity of recruitment. We
initiated recruitment through networks from RIS in
Delhi, emailing the Participant Information Sheet and
HIF information (Appendix 1), and then snowballed.
The information sheet included reasons for this
research project and conflicts of interest. Of 49
potential participants contacted, 23 responded
(47%). Fourteen face-to-face interviews were con-
ducted in English between 19 February and 5 March
2015 (nine individuals declined due to unwillingness
or lack of availability) (Appendix 3). Therefore, over-
all participation rate was 14/49 (29%).
Data collection
Informed consent was gained from each participant
(Appendix 4). No relationship was established with
participants prior to study initiation. The interview
guide (Appendix 5) was based on literature regarding
health policy in India, the HIF and on topics derived
from the study aims. It was not pilot tested but agreed
by all authors. We conducted semi-structured face-
to-face interviews using this stakeholder analysis fra-
mework [30], aiming to recruit from each of the six
stakeholder groups. Interviews were conducted at the
office of the stakeholder or a location convenient for
them which would facilitate audio recording. We
asked for stakeholder views regarding: access to med-
icine in India, interest and opinions with respect to
the HIF, suggestions for improving access to medi-
cines, as well as potential alliances and resources to
translate the HIF into reality. The interviews lasted
20–60 minutes and were all, except one, audio-
recorded using a digital tape recorder. Notes were
made during the interviews. The interviews were
conducted by PM, as a medical student, following
basic training in qualitative research at the
University of Birmingham and mentorship from
senior researchers involved in qualitative research
(AB, DP and RS).
Analysis
Following transcription of the recorded interviews,
we assessed transcripts for any typological errors
and removed any confidential information.
Transcripts were not returned to participants for
comment or correction. We used directed content
analysis [37] with principal themes of the HIF and
access to medicines. In particular, with respect to
access, we considered availability (the supply and
demand), affordability (the drug price and patients’
ability to pay), accessibility (physical access) and
adaptability (the relationship between patients per-
ceptions and what is being offered) as per previous
studies of access to medicines [4]. Initially, text rele-
vant to each theme was highlighted. The highlighted
passages of text were then coded using pre-deter-
mined codes in NVivo 10.0. This process continued
until all highlighted data were fully coded. We then
conducted a more inductive sub-coding [38],
whereby all coded data were sub-coded for further
detail. Coding was undertaken by PM and AB.
A reflexive approach was ensured by completion
of a diary throughout the process, and the primary
researcher (PM) could question interpretations to
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ensure no conflict of interest and bias minimization.
Quotations used as evidence in the results have been
edited (in terms of syntax) for flow [39]. On the basis
of power/influence and interest (classified by the
coder) in the HIF in line with previous studies [32],
each participant was classified as a ‘defender’ (high
interest, low power), ‘bystander’ (low interest, low
power), ‘driver’ (high interest, high power) or
‘blocker’ (low interest, high power) with respect to
the HIF as a policy (Figure 1). This terminology was
developed by AB and PM. A defender would have
high motivation to defend the HIF from criticism but
low influence. A bystander is low on influence and
interest and unlikely to promote or criticize the HIF.
A driver is a powerful supporter of the HIF. A
blocker is an influential opponent to the HIF. The
assigned category was not checked with the partici-
pant. The study was designed and reported to meet
consolidated criteria for reporting qualitative research
(COREQ) [40] and the relevant sections of the
COREQ checklist are described in the relevant sec-
tions above.
Results
Most stakeholders felt there were significant issues
with access to medicines in India, yet their views
regarding the proposed HIF were mixed and,
although positive in general, there was scepticism
with multiple perceived disadvantages. Few stake-
holders demonstrated total opposition to the HIF
and when opposition was noted, it was focused on
amendment of the HIF rather than the aim of
improving access to medicines per se.
Views on access to medicines in India
Access to most citizens is poor and heterogeneous
despite a strong domestic pharmaceutical industry
The prevailing idea that access is poor for the major-
ity of Indians was common. Although participants
from pharmaceutical and government sectors agreed,
they focused on different aspects, for example:
[The pharmaceutical] industry has done remarkably
well to meet the country’s need and at prices which
are ... I mean you may say compared to Indian
income may not be affordable still but if you com-
pare with the world prices these are very, very low
prices. (P1; Pharmaceutical; Driver)
The view that the ‘[pharmaceutical] industry has
done remarkably well’ is to be expected from a repre-
sentative of that industry, yet a candid view on the
issue with access was still given. The price may be
cheap, but even that relatively low price is still, for
many, out of reach when the nation ‘has a vast
amount of the population which is in the category
of absolutely poor or extremely poor . . . so whatever
price drugs are available . . . they won’t be able to
purchase these medicines’ (P6; Government;
Bystander). Government and ministerial participants
corroborated the opinion of the pharmaceutical
industry that despite there being issues with afford-
ability, as the public health expert states, the ‘situation
is improving significantly with the state governments
Figure 1. Stakeholder analysis matrix comparing the interest of each actor with their perceived power and influence on health
policy.
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taking an active role in expanding free supply of
medicines’ (P10; Government; Driver). This goes to
the heart of access to medicines in India; that health-
care is a state-based issue and there is large inter-state
heterogeneity:
Contrast is the name that can be given in many
health situations or for that matter any matter of
health or any walk of life in India. So in some states
there may be reasonably strong access but in some
states it may be just not that great. (P9; Public
Health; Defender)
Access to medicines includes medicines that are off-
patent, and produced by generic companies, as well
as those on-patent. Many of the participants referred
to overall access being poor but a few highlighted the
issue of highly expensive patented medicines.
For example, ‘when it comes to medicine and
particularly the patented medicines . . . it is basically
coming from abroad. Most of it is coming from
abroad and they have put the prices as very high’
(P11; Pharmaceutical; Defender).
The mention of the high cost for patented medicines
must be put into the context of the low purchasing
power of many Indians. If these ‘extremely poor’ citi-
zens are unable to purchase any medicines, as partici-
pant 6 suggested, then the novel patented medicines are
well beyond their purchasing capability. In other words,
the scale of the price is less important than the need for
free supply of medicine in India.
Branded generics inflate prices
The issue with affordability is not solely with expensive
patented medicines but several participants also identi-
fied an issue with ‘branded generics’ (versions of a drug
that are bioequivalent to the original product, but are
marketed under another company’s brand name):
You have had what is known as branded generics . . .
this is the main challenge I would feel. This is per-
petuated because the prescriptions are largely written
in brand name and not in generic name ... If pre-
scription is in a brand name then the patient almost
mistakes a brand name for a medicine. (P10;
Government; Driver)
This gives rise to a situation where ‘access may be
stratified on information flow’ (P12; Research fun-
der). If the patient is unable to challenge the doctor,
who prescribed branded and not generic drugs, due
to lack of awareness, then unnecessary higher drug
costs ensue, and ‘though we have a lot of generics in
India, still they are expensive’ (P2; Public health;
Defender).
Out-of-pocket expenditure dominates
Out-of-pocket expenditure and catastrophic health
expenditure were perceived as major issues:
Drugs are meant to be free in public healthcare but
are often unavailable and so patients buy out-of-
pocket from local shops themselves. (P9; Public
Health; Defender)
Lot of our reports . . . very clearly indicate that one
chronic ailment, one acute case, the person is
indebted. He has to sell land and even we have
seen family members becoming destitute. (P6;
Government; Bystander)
Views on the health impact fund
Table 1, the stakeholder analysis matrix, represents
stakeholder opinions with respect to the HIF’s policy
implementation. The majority (12/14; 86%) of the
participants were unaware of the HIF prior to being
invited to participate in the research. The stakeholder
analysis showed that one participant (P14; NGO) was
a potential ‘blocker’ of the HIF, with four participants
classified as ‘drivers’ (P1; Pharmaceutical; P7; Public
health; P10; Government; P13; NGO). Two partici-
pants were considered ‘bystanders’ (P5; NGO; P6;
Government) and the remaining seven interviewees
were ‘defenders’. Other than two individuals, all other
participants highlighted affordability as a major
determinant of drugs in India. Availability was the
second most commonly cited issue (in 9/14). No
Table 1. Stakeholder analysis matrix comparing the interest of each actor in the Health Impact Fund with their perceived power
and influence on health policy setting.
PARTICIPANT NUMBER SECTOR POWER/INFLUENCE INTEREST CATEGORY
DOMAIN OF ACCESS TO MEDICINES
availability affordability accessibility adaptability
1 Pharmaceutical High High Driver x x
2 Public Health Low High Defender x x x
3 IP law Low High Defender x x x
4 Public Health Low High Defender x x
5 NGO Low Low Bystander x x x
6 Government Low Low Bystander x x
7 Public Health High High Driver x x x
8 Research Funding Low High Defender x x
9 Public Health Low High Defender x x
10 Government Low Low Driver x x
11 Pharmaceutical Low High Defender x x x
12 Research Funding Low High Defender x x
13 NGO High High Driver x x
14 NGO High Low Blocker x x
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participants listed affordability as the only issue in
access to medicines.
Perceived positives of the health impact fund
The underlying aim of the HIF (to increase access to
medicines) was generally praised, for example:
For a practising public health professional in India, if
you get some superior quality of drug at the lowest
price, and assuring its availability, by and large, in a
reasonably big way. . .and there is some regulatory
mechanism that which drugs are to be there and
which drugs not: that is a dream situation. (P9;
Public health; Defender)
But do you think it is feasible? (Interviewer)
But whether it is feasible or not, that is a different
issue. (P9; Public health; Defender).
Support for the HIF’s ideals, but reservations about
its capabilities, were common to many participants.
The frequently held view was that India should,
and would, be able to commit to financing such an
initiative; for example: ‘I am sure the developed coun-
tries will put in money and India should not be found
lagging behind much’ (P10; Government; Driver).
This builds on a sense of pride by the Indian nation;
to not be ‘lagging behind’ but to contribute to global
initiatives that aim to improve access to medicine.
This view was corroborated by other participants:
‘there are India, South Africa, Brazil, the BRICS
countries. . . So because they are the emerging donors
also . . . they may be interested in some of these global
activities’ (P9; Public health; Defender). The view that
funding should be possible is encouraging.
Perceived negatives of the health impact fund
policy concept
The strongest criticism of the HIF was that it may not
have value in the poorest settings ‘in countries such
as sub-Saharan Africa, for example, where the public
health challenges are huge. In fact, you don’t require
new and innovative drugs, you are just required to
improve the health systems over there, use the best
available drugs which can make a big change. What
would be the role of Health Impact Fund?’ (P4;
Public health; Defender).
A major concern was that the HIF was too small to
have an impact: ‘Even this $6 billion for the HIF, with
this looking at diseases with market, to me it does not
make sense because this is too modest a figure’ (P5;
NGO; Bystander).
Moreover, there was scepticism about how impact
assessment may actually function:
I don’t think the Health Impact Fund is very well
fleshed out. How do you sort of define these steps for
reward and impact measurement and who pays for it
and how does it all go in? (P14; NGO; Blocker)
This Health Impact Fund, they need to do some
more work not just with government but have a
dialogue with the industry. (P1-Pharmaceutical;
Driver)
Perhaps the most interesting critique of the HIF was
that, by working within current worldwide intellec-
tual property frameworks, i.e. TRIPS, it was less likely
to improve access to medicines:
I am not sure whether this can be a good model
because the current patent system is broken. . . Unless
we do something about breaking that monopoly we
are not going to see medicines made available. (P2;
Public health; Defender).
‘. . ...the strong intellectual property regime. . . would
get legitimacy. . . This has been one of the questions
which the Health Impact Fund has always faced, and
other proposals have faced.’ (P6; Government;
Bystander).
The HIF would only offer pharmaceutical companies
an alternative; they could still continue monopoly
marketing, which was perceived to be against equita-
ble global access to medicines:
‘I am not very optimistic of a state instrumentality
really solving this problem of the greed of pharma
companies to make money.’ (P10; Government;
Driver)
Indian pharmaceutical representatives argued that a
research base must exist in India, in order for funding
post-marketing (as outlined in the HIF) to be tenable:
‘We don’t have experience of developing new original
molecules. Therefore, the developing country industry
does not have access to these funds’ (P1;
Pharmaceutical; Driver).
This would create a situation where the HIF may be
‘skewed towards big pharma because it seems to be
supportive of the big pharma’s argument in terms of
we innovate and we produce these drugs and so we
should get the profits’ (P4; Public health; Defender).
Several participants argued that patented medi-
cines were not the priority:
‘I am not saying that patented medicines don’t have
an important role but I am saying that look. . . pro-
blems will exist but you can largely overcome the
problems in Indian context by settling the generic
medicine pricing and use’ (P10; Government; Driver).
Suggestions to alter the health impact fund to
best improve access to medicines
Focus on diseases with no market/ neglected
diseases
The limited size of the estimated yearly funding pool, $6
billion, and resulting need formore focus were frequently
emphasised:
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‘Prioritise the areas you want to tackle because there
are so many different countries, diversities, demogra-
phies and differing needs. . . as the name suggests
“Health Impact Fund”, to me you can create impact
if you are focused on a few well-chosen priorities’
(P13; NGO; Driver).
‘If I am the CEO of the Health Impact Fund. . . I
would look at those diseases which could make an
impact where industry is unable to do, where there
is a market failure. . . the entire area of neglected
diseases requires attention. . . companies will require
to be incentivised to do these trials. . . Those are areas
which I would like to focus because this is not a big
amount. It is only 6 billion’ (P5; NGO; Bystander).
Fund innovation directly
Indian pharmaceutical companies may lack sufficient
research and development capabilities to create new
molecules. Amendment of the HIF to offer partial
funding of research and development was suggested:
‘You must fund research scientists who are working
in the lab, as they say from the bench to the bedside,
you cannot just focus on the bedside or in between,
you have got to focus some [money] on the bench as
well. So part of the fund, I think, should be. . . to
kick-start enterprise and research’ (P8; Ministry and
government sector).
For me the Health Impact Fund is not something
that companies will go for. They will probably try
and resell something that they already have, to the
Health Impact Fund . . . so offering the money at the
end of the chain really doesn’t help, it is the work
that you do at the beginning of the chain that really
makes a difference . . .. Like for example a bio-marker
for a TB test that will help you get TB in urine or
blood is not something that the companies will do.
(P14; International healthcare NGO)
Discussion
This is the first stakeholder analysis regarding the
HIF and access to medicines in India. We note
three key findings. First, access to medicines is per-
ceived to be a major problem in India by all stake-
holders, involving branded and generic drugs and it is
not only the problem of pricing, which is the main
target of the HIF. Second, although several stake-
holders supported the HIF as a vehicle to improve
access to medicines, there were major concerns about
its scaleability, feasibility and impact, mainly because
drug pricing alone does not equate to drug access.
Third, in order to overcome barriers to the HIF,
novel drug-related health policies may need to be
more radical, e.g. working outside the existing IP
regime, targeting generic as well as branded drugs,
or extending to research and development.
A poorly funded public health system drives
many Indians to buy branded drugs out-of-pocket
and previous research [41] has emphasized
heterogeneity in access [42]. However, it is of
great interest that members of all stakeholder
groups, including the pharmaceutical sector, feel
strongly that the status quo is problematic. In the
Global Burden of Disease Study, India ranked
154th among 195 countries for healthcare access
and quality [43]; therefore, the problem is wider
than access to medicines. Moreover, there is wide
regional variation across India in disease burden
and disease outcomes [44]. Although there is
likely to be support for policies tackling access to
medicines, it is unlikely that a single health policy
reform (such as the HIF) can tackle all or even
most of the problems around access to medicines
[45]. Therefore, as the WHO highlights, priority-
setting is required [41], and branded medicines
may not be the highest priority. In India, generic
drugs are a major component of the pharmaceu-
tical market and with the advent of multiple
‘fixed-dose combination’ preparations (or ‘poly-
pills’), there is scope for generic or non-patented
medications to be included in rewards which are
dependent on impact assessment (such as
the HIF).
There is stakeholder support for change, but our
analysis (Table 1) suggests a wide range of perceived
power and interest of stakeholders, even within stake-
holder group (e.g. government or NGO) regarding the
HIF. Although the majority were in favour rather than
against, it is clear that policies which improve access to
medicines, whether to gain support of government or
the pharmaceutical sector, will require consideration of
more than drug affordability. Any policy aiming to
tackle access to medicines should be multi-sectoral
and involve consultation of multiple, different stake-
holders, in order to maximize support and likelihood of
success, as well as using available information regard-
ing affordability, availability and other components of
access [4]. Reassuringly, several stakeholders felt that
the HIF may not be radical enough, suggesting again
that policy reform has to be cross-sectoral and cannot
be a ‘stand-alone’ measure. The IP regime was repeat-
edly highlighted as a barrier to improving access, as was
the lack of available funding for research into new
molecular entities in India. There are other policy
solutions which have been ‘field-tested’ in India and
in other countries, including local pharmaceutical pro-
duction [46], managed entry agreements [47] and gen-
eric drug prioritization [48]. Pharmaceutical policy has
been shown to vary by country income, and no policy
is likely to be a ‘one-size-fits-all’ [49]. Before the HIF
can be implemented, policy details such as the exact
nature of health impact assessment and reward
mechanisms need to be finalized. Moreover, research
and modelling of the pharmaceutical market (branded
versus generic, pre- and post-trial drugs, common ver-
sus rare diseases, well-funded versus poorly funded
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diseases) are essential to maximize feasibility and
ensure credibility [4].
There are several limitations inherent in our study.
This was a relatively small qualitative study and only a
limited number of stakeholders from each sector were
interviewed. The absence of a representative from the
Ministry of Finance was a specific limitation that meant
data on the feasibility of funding for healthcare initia-
tives was poor. The stakeholders that participated in
the study may have been more interested in the policy,
thereby agreeing to an interview, than those who did
not reply to the recruiting emails. The participants
were all in senior positions and may be somewhat
distanced from the ‘reality on the ground’, but, con-
versely, these individuals were more likely to have a ‘big
picture’ policy perspective. Perhaps most importantly,
the interviewer was a medical student from the UK,
who was not experienced in qualitative research, espe-
cially in the Indian context, despite appropriate train-
ing and mentorship arrangements in the UK and India.
Conversely, compared with having an Indian expert or
an experienced researcher in access to medicines con-
ducting the research, the bias in interviews was likely to
have been minimised.
The stakeholders may have not given detailed ana-
lysis on the HIF due to unfamiliarity with its proposals
and a potential unwillingness to disregard a potential
policy that they have not fully researched, which may
introduce bias. However, the framework did enable a
detailed appreciation of both each stakeholder’s initial
views and interest in the policy as well as assessing their
power, giving important information to then move the
policy forward. We solely focused on the HIF, but the
findings may be relevant to development of other poli-
cies regarding access to medicines in India with prob-
able relevance but not necessarily generalizability to
other countries. The stakeholders and particular bar-
riers and facilitators for access to medicines are coun-
try-specific and therefore further studies are needed in
other countries. Although two authors (AB and DP)
have advisory roles in relation to the HIF, a balanced
view was possible and reporting of the mixed views of
stakeholders, including concerns about significant lim-
itations show that the risks of bias and conflict of
interest were low.
The HIF is one novel solution to the lack of access
and innovation in medicines that requires pilot data
and field testing. Several international initiatives over
the last two decades, including the Gavi (the global
vaccine alliance), the Global Fund for TB, Malaria
and HIV/AIDS, numerous public-private partnerships
and research and development funding schemes have
aimed to improve access to medicines for neglected
tropical diseases. Compared with these solutions,
which have tended to be disease-focused, short-term
and vertical in nature, the HIF may offer a system-wide
incentive to improve drug innovation based on the
greatest global health impact, but it has its own pro-
blems of focusing on drugs rather than health systems,
and patented rather than generic drugs.
Conclusion
Access to medicines is perceived to be an important
issue in India, requiring urgent policy reform, according
to our stakeholder analysis. The Health Impact Fund, a
proposal to improve access to medicines by incentivis-
ing pharmaceutical companies to produce drugs with
the greatest global health impact, is one such suggestion,
but may not be far-reaching enough to be successful in
its aim of improving access to medicines. The impor-
tance of context-specific quantitative and qualitative
data (via stakeholder analysis) prior to policy reform
and implementation is highlighted by our study.
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Appendix 2.
Health impact assessment in the HIF (quoted and
adapted from Banerjee, A., Hollis, A and Pogge, T. The
Health Impact Fund: incentives for improving access to
medicines. Lancet. 2010;375(9709):166–169)
The health impact assessment will draw on the same types
of information that agencies such as the National Institute
for Health and Clinical Excellence (NICE) now use to make
recommendations about listing new drugs, but will aim to
update this information with data for use of the drug and
information from new practical trials. No method of health
impact assessment could be perfect and indisputable in its
measurements or the estimates produced from it. However,
although these drawbacks are serious, the real comparison
is not with a perfect system but with the present situation.
In the UK, where drug insurance is universal and NICE
assesses the cost-effectiveness of medicines, the present
situation can be viewed as a reward system in which each
sale of a drug creates a reward equal to the difference
between the price and the cost of manufacture and distri-
bution. The size of the reward per pill is fixed on the basis
of information provided to NICE at the time of drug
approval, and is typically not modified to show new infor-
mation. Thus, the UK system is essentially a simple reward
system in which the reward equals the price–cost margin
multiplied by the number of units sold.
The HIF’s health impact assessment would improve on
this standard in at least five important ways:
● physician survey data about actual use of medicines
● evidence for drug use in medical practice through practical trials
● patient usage data through surveys of patients who were prescribed
the drug
● outcomes data
● data from post-approval phase 4 clinical trials, especially compara-
tive trials.
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Appendix 4
Appendix 3. Participants
Participant
number Organisation Sector Position
Date of
interview
P1 Indian Pharmaceutical Alliance Pharmaceutical Senior 19/02/2015
P2 Public Health Foundation of India Public Health Senior Public Health
Specialist and Assistant
Professor
19/02/2015
P3 SKS Law Associates (patent law) IP law Senior 21/02/2015
P4 Centre for Chronic Disease Control Public Health Senior 24/02/2015
P5 Open Source Drug Discovery NGO Senior 24/02/2015
P6 Institute for Studies in Industrial Development Government Senior 25/2/2015
P7 World Health Organization Public Health Senior 26/02/2015
P8 Biotechnology Industry Research Assistance
Council (BIRAC)
Research Funding Organization Senior 01/03/2015
P9 Indian Institute of Public Health Public Health Senior 02/03/2015
P10 National Pharmaceutical Pricing Authority Government Senior 02/03/2015
P11 Indian Drug Manufacturers Association Pharmaceutical Senior 03/03/2015
P12 Wellcome Trust Research Funding Organization Senior 04/03/2015
P13 NATHEALTH-Healthcare Foundation of India NGO Senior 05/03/2015
P14 Medecin Sans Frontieres NGO Senior 05/03/2015
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